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Lexicography is an art-and one where practical considerations outweigh 
scientific considerations. Linguistics has discovered a great many new facts 
about words in recent years, but this does not necessarily mean that such facts 
can or even should be included in any dictionary no matter what its degree of 
abridgement. In fact, including technical linguistic discoveries in a dictionary 
may be the last thing a good lexicographer would want to do. On the other 
hand, technical linguistic discoveries, if used as a very subservient handmaiden 
to lexicographic craft, could conceivably lead to better dictionaries. What I 
would like to do is report on some linguistic discoveries, knowing that they 
cannot and should not be directly applied to the making of dictionaries, but 
nonetheless hoping that some lexicographers will find a way to make practical 
use of them. 
As any lexicographer knows, natural language. concepts are fuzzy; the 
boundaries are not clear-cut. Zadeh has suggested that fuzziness should be 
handleable formally in terms of what he calls fuzzy set theory.’ In a fuzzy 
set, an individual is not simply a member or a non-member, but may be a 
member to some degree, for example, any real number between 0 and 1. Take 
the fuzzy concept of tallness. Someone who is 6’5” is clearly tall, and someone 
who is 5’0” is clearly not tall. But what about someone who is 5’7”, 5’9”, 5‘1 l”? 
Zadeh suggests that such individuals exhibit intermediate degrees of tallness. 
Obviously, as one’s height becomes greater, so one’s degree of tallness becomes 
greater-until a certain threshold is reached. Zadeh has suggested that con- 
cepts such as tall are to be represented graphically, pretty much as in FIGURE 1. 
Interestingly enough, there are words that change fuzziness. Consider, for 
example, the expression “sort of.” The concept “sort of tall,” if represented 
graphically, would look approximately as in FIGURE 2. Clearly, if someone is 
6’5“, he is not sort of tall-he is just plain tall. But if you are, say, 5’9”, then 
you are sort of tall. Essentially, the expression “sort of” raises the intermediate 
values and lowers the high values for “tall.” One might think that tallness is a 
rather special case. After all, tallness can be described as a continuous function 
of height plus various contextual factors. But what about more “discrete” 
concepts? Take the concept of a bird. Heider,* in a psychological experiment, 
has shown that people do not perceive birdiness as a yes-or-no affair. Rather 
there seem to be gradations of birdiness. A hierarchy like that given in ( 1 )  
emerged from her studies. 
* This work was partially supported by grant NSF-2939 from the National Science 
Foundation to the University of Michigan. It was written while the author was in 
residence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif. 
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FIGURE 1 
(1  ) Birdiness hierarchy 
robins, sparrows 
chickens, ducks, geese 
penguins, pelicans 
bats 
A robin is more typical of a bird than a chicken and a chicken is more typical 
of a bird than a penguin. Bats have a very small degree of birdiness, and COWS 
none at all. We can represent these results graphically with discrete points as 
in FIGURE 3. Corresponding sentences in ( 2 )  show, of course, a corresponding 
degree of truth. 
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(2) Degree of truth (corresponding to degree of category membership) 
a. A robin is a bird. 
b. A chicken is a bird. 
c. A penguin is a bird. 
d. A bat is a bird. 
e. A cow is a bird. 
(true) 
(less true than a) 
(less true than b) 
(false, or at least very far from true) 
(absolutely false) 
Now suppose that bird is modified by “sort of.” Consider sentences in (3). 
(3) a. A robin is sort of a bird. (False-it is a bird, no question about 
b. A chicken is sort of a bird. (True, or very close to true) 
c. A penguin is sort of a bird. (True, or close to true) 
d. A bat is a sort of a bird. (Still pretty close to false) 
e. A cow is a sort of a bird. (False) 
it) 
What one gets is, graphically, the graph of FIGURE 4. If one fills in the line to 
0 0 0 
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form a continuous curve, one can see that the effect of “sort of“ on degrees of 
birdiness is very much like the effect of “sort of” on the concept of tallness. 
I have referred to words like “sort of“ as “hedges.” A small and relatively 
random list is given on the following page. What I would like to suggest is that 
study of hedges reveals a great deal about meaning that is not obvious. Hedges 
do not merely reveal distinctions of degree of category membership. They can 
also reveal a great deal more structural information. Consider (4 ) .  
(4) a. Esther Williams is a fish. 
b. Esther Williams is a regular fish. 
(4a) is false, since Esther Williams is a human being, not a fish. (4b), on the 
other hand, would seem to be true, since it says that Esther Williams swims 
well and is at home in water. Note that (4b) does not assert that Esther 
Williams has gills, scales, fins, a tail, etc. In fact, (4b) presupposes that 
Esther Williams is not literally a fish and asserts that she has certain other 
characteristic properties of a fish. Bolinger (in press) has suggested that 
regular picks out certain “metaphorical” properties. We can see what this 
means in an example like ( 5 ) .  
( 5 )  a. John is a bachelor. 
b. John is a regular bachelor. 
(5b) would not be said of a bachelor. It might be said of a married man 
who acts like a bachelor-dates a lot, feels unbound by marital responsibilities, 
etc. In short, regular seems to assert the connotations of “bachelor,” while 
presupposing the negation of the literal meaning. (6)  reveals the same fact, 
though perhaps more clearly. 
(6) a. Sarah is a spinster. 
b. Sarah is a regular spinster. 
(6) asserts that Sarah has certain characteristics properties of spinsters- 
presumably that she is prissy and disdains sexual activity. (6b) would not be 
said of someone who was literally a spinster, but might be said either of a 
married woman or a girl who was not yet past marriageable age who acted like 
a spinster. What (6b) asserts is the connotation of “spinster”-prissiness 
and lack of sexual activity, while presupposing the negation of the literal 
meaning. 
If this account of the meaning of regular is essentially correct, a rather 
important conclusion follows. It is usually assumed that the connotations of 
words are part of pragmatics-the wastebasket of the study of meaning. 
Certainly most philosophers seem to take it for granted that connotations and 
other pragmatic aspects of meaning are irrelevant to the assignment of truth 
values (leaving aside sentences containing indexical expressions). Truth is 
usually taken to involve literal or denotative meaning alone. Yet in sentences 
with regular, such as (4b), (5b) and (6b), the truth value of the sentences 
as a whole depends not upon the literal meaning of the predicates involved, 
but strictly upon their connotations! What this indicates, I think, is that se- 
mantics cannot be taken to be independent of pragmatics, but the two are 
inextricably tied together. 
In the above discussion I used the terms “literal meaning” and “connotation” 
as though they were adequate to describe at least informally the types of 
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as it were 
in a sense 
nearly 
in one sense 
commonly 
typically 
Some Hedges and Related Phenomena 
in a real sense 
in an important sense 
in a way 
mutatis mutandis 
in a manner of speaking 
details aside 






all but technically 
practically 
all but a 
anything but a 
a self-styled 
nominally 
he calls himself a . . . 
in name only 
actually 
really 
(he) as much as . . . 
-like 
-ish 
can be looked upon as 
can be viewed as 
pseudo- 
crypto- 
(he’s) another (Caruso/ 
-is the-of - 
Lincoln/Babe Ruth . . .) 
(e.g., America is the 
Roman Empire of the 
modern world. 
Chomsky is the 
DeGaulle of 
Linguistics, etc.) 
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meaning components affected by hedges and related words. But as might be 
expected the situation is more complex. We can see this if we try to find 
some hedges that are opposites of regular, ones which pick out literal meaning 
alone. Two promising candidates are strictly speaking and technically. 
(7) a. A whale is technically a mammal. 
b. Strictly speaking a whale is a mammal. 
Technically and strictly speaking seem to have the same effect in (7a) and (b) .  
However, in other sentences they produce radically different results. 
(8) a. Richard Nixon is technically a Quaker. (true) 
b. Strictly speaking, Richard Nixon is a Quaker. (false) 
(9) a. Ronald Reagan is technically a cattle rancher. (true) 
b. Strictly speaking, Ronald Reagan is a cattle rancher. (false) 
As (8) and (9) show, technically picks out some definitional criterion, while 
strictly speaking requires both the definitional criterion and other important 
criteria as well. Richard Nixon may be a Quaker in some definitional sense, 
but he does not have the religious and ethical views characteristic of Quakers. 
He meets the definitional criterion, but not other important criteria. Ronald 
Reagan meets a definitional criterion for being a cattle rancher, since he happens 
to have bought cattle stocks as a tax dodge (which is how he avoided 1970 
income taxes). However, he does not meet all of the primary criteria for being 
a cattle rancher. 
( 10) a. Strictly speaking, George Wallace is a racist. 
b. Technically, George Wallace is a racist. 
Note that, as (10) shows, technically seem to mean only technically, that is it 
asserts that the definitional criteria are met but that some important criterion 
for category membership is not met. Hence the strangeness of ( lob ) .  
Strictly speaking contrasts interestingly with loosely speaking. 
( 11 ) a. Strictly speaking, a whale is a mammal. 
b. Loosely speaking, a whale is a fish. 
( 11 ) shows the need for distinguishing between important or primary prop- 
erties on the one hand and secondary properties on the other hand. ( I l a )  says 
that whales classify as mammals if we take into account important criteria for 
distinguishing mammals from fish. For example, they give live birth and 
breathe air. ( 1 1 b) seems to say that we can classify whales as fish if we ignore 
the primary properties and take into account certain secondary properties, for 
example, their general appearance and the fact that they live in water. Thus, 
we need to distinguish between primary and secondary criteria for category 
membership. 
However, loosely speaking still differs sharply from regular, as the following 
examples show: 
(12) a. Harry is a regular fish. 
b. Loosely speaking, Harry is a fish. 
( 13) a. Loosely speaking, a whale is a fish. 
b. A whale is a regular fish. 
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What is strange about (12b) is that it asserts that Harry is a member of the 
category fish to some degree by virtue of having some secondary property of 
fish. (12a) simply says that he swims well and is at home in water, while it 
presupposes that he is not a member of the category fish to any degree whatso- 
ever. The distinction between (12a) and (12b) indicates that we must distin- 
guish between those properties capable of conferring some degree of category 
membership and those properties which happen to be characteristic of category 
members, but do not confer category membership to any degree at all. No 
matter how well you swim, that won’t make you a fish to any degree at all. 
But if you are a living being, live in the water, are shaped like a fish, and 
your only limbs are flippers and a tail, it would seem that, like the whale, you 
are, loosely speaking, that is by virtue of secondary criteria, a member of the 
category fish to some extent. Note that (13b) is odd in that it presupposes 
that the whale is not a member of the category fish to any extent. 
An adequate account of the functioning of characteristic-though-incidental 
properties should provide an understanding of at least one type of metaphor. 
Suppose I say “John is a fish.” I am using a metaphor to indicate either that 
he swims well or that he is slimy (in the nonliteral sense). The mechanism 
for this is, I think, something like the following. Since it is presupposed that the 
subject, John, is not literally a member of the category fish, one cannot be 
asserting membership in that category if the sentence is to make sense. Instead, 
the sentence is understood in essentially the same way as “John is a regular 
fish,” that is, the contextually most important incidental-though-characteristic 
properties are asserted. 
By looking at  just four hedges-technically, strictly speaking, loosely speak- 
ing and regular-we have seen that we must distinguish at least four types 
of criteria for category membership: 
(14) Types of Criteria 
e or conremng category rnernoersnip 10 a 
1 degree depending on various factors 
4. Characteristicsthough incidental-not capable of conferring cate- 
gory membership to any degree, but contributes 
to degree of category membership if some de- 
gree of membership is otherwise established. 
These distinctions are necessary for even a primitive account of how such 
hedges function. Such a primitive account is given in ( 15). 
(15) An Informal and Inadequate Approximation to an Understanding of 
Some Hedges 
TECHNICALLY-Truth value depends upon values of definitional 
criteria alone. Implies that at least one primary 
criterion is below the threshold value for simple 
category membership. 
STRICTLY SPEAKING-Truth value depends on value of defini- 
tional and primary criteria. Values for 
each criterion must be above certain 
threshold values. 
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LOOSELY SPEAKING-Truth value depends primarily on sec- 
ondary criteria. Implies that threshold 
values for definitional and primary criteria 
are insufficient to confer category member- 
ship. 
REGULAR-Truth value depends upon characteristic-though-inci- 
dental criteria. It is presupposed that the values of 
other criteria are insufficient to establish any degree 
of category membership. 
There are two points to be made here for lexicography. First, there are 
words like “sort of” and “regular” whose meaning can only be given by the 
way they affect the meanings of other words. This is true of hedges in general. 
Secondly, hedges reveal that there is a structure to meaning criteria; and such 
structure is rarely revealed in dictionary definitions. To take an example, 
consider the following entry for “fish” in the Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language. 
( 16) 1. Any of various cold-blooded, completely aquatic vertebrates, hav- 
ing gills, commonly !ins, and typically an elongated body usually 
covered with scales. 
2. Any of various other aquatic animals. 
(Note the use of hedges “typically,” “commonly,” and “usually” in the defini- 
tion of 1.) 
As the study of hedges reveals, these are not two separate, distinct meanings 
for the word “fish.” Rather they arise out of the hierarchical structure of 
meaning criteria. In contexts where the term is used loosely, one gets the second 
reading, while in contexts where the term is used strictly, one gets the first. 
When it comes to the meaning criteria picked out by the hedge “regular,” 
dictionaries are often of little or no help. Consider the following entries in the 
definitions for “bachelor,” “spinster,” and “lawyer” in the Random House 
dictionary. 
(17) Bachelor: 1. An unmarried man. 
Spinster: 1. A woman still unmarried beyond the usual age of 
marrying; an old maid. 2. Chiefly law. A woman 
who has never married. 
1. A person whose profession is to conduct lawsuits for 
citizens in a court of law and to advise 6r act for clients 
in other legal matters. 
There is no way that, say, a non-speaker of English could, looking at these 
dictionary definitions, figure out what the following sentences mean. 
Lawyer: 
( 18) a. He is a regular bachelor. 
b. She is a regular spinster. 
c. He is a regular lawyer. 
The reason is that dictionaries don’t usually include connotational information. 
The Random House entry for “politician” is more helpful. 
(18) Politician-1. A person who is active in party politics. 2. A seeker 
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or holder of public office who is more concerned 
about winning favor or retaining power than about 
maintaining principles. 3. A person who holds a 
political office, 4. A person skilled in political govern- 
ment or administration; statesman. 5 .  An expert in 
politics or political government. 6. A person who 
seeks to gain power or  advancement within an or- 
ganization in ways that are generally disapproved. 
S y n .  4. Politician, statesman refer to one skilled in 
politics. These terms differ particularly in their con- 
notations; politician is more often derogatory, states- 
man laudatory. Politician suggests the schemes and 
devices of one who engages in (esp. small) politics 
for party ends or his own advantage: a dishonest 
politician. Statesman suggests the eminent ability, fore- 
sight, and unselfish devotion to the interests of his 
country of one dealing with (esp. important or great) 
affairs of state: a distinguished statesman. 
One practical thing that lexicographers could do is include more informal dis- 
cussions of the sort given at the end of (18), not only concerning connotations, 
but various types‘of meaning criteria. 
There has been a trend within linguistics in recent years to investigate how 
lexical items can be decomposed into component meanings. A classical example 
is the word “kill” which, it has been suggested, has the meaning of “(directly) 
cause to become not alive.” Such structures can be shown to be necessary for 
the description of meaning by the way that hedges work when they are used to 
modify words like “kill.” Consider the sentences: 
(19) In a sense it was John who killed Mary. 
(20) What John did was, in a sense, kill Mary. 
In (19) the “in a sense” hedges on the directness of the causation. It would 
be appropriately used just in case, say, John didn’t directly cause Mary’s death, 
though he might be said, indirectly through something he did, to have caused 
Mary’s death. In (20) the hedge modifies “alive.” So the second sentence 
might be used in a case where John didn’t literally kill Mary, but, say, where 
he did something to ruin her career, given that her career was something she 
held very precious, and that her whole ego depended on. That is, he might 
have destroyed her professional life. 
A similar case to the example in (20) occurs with the word “orphan.” 
An orphan might be defined as an individual, usually a child, whose parents 
are not alive. Now consider the sentence: 
(2 1 ) In a sense, John is an orphan. 
(21) might be said of someone whose parents were not literally dead but, 
say,’ had been in a bad accident and would never recover consciousness thoEgh 
they were literally alive. In this case “in a sense” is hedging on “alive.” 
Similarly, it might hedge on “parents.” That is, it .might pick out people who 
were “in a sense” parents, for example, mentors in the business world. So, for 
instance, a junior executive might be said to have become “an orphan in a 
sense’’ if all of his mentors were fired from the company. 
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Hedges have only just begun to be investigated, and my guess is that 
further research will yield considerable insight not only into the way they 
operate, but also into the semantic structure of lexical items. This is an 
enterprise in which, I think, linguists and lexicographers can make use of 
one another’s knowledge. It is an area where lexicographers can use their 
detailed knowledge of words, acquired through the practice of their craft, to 
make contributions to a linguistic understanding of lexical meaning. And I hope 
that the use of hedges as a tool for determining types of meaning criteria will 
lead to an even greater heightening of the lexicographer’s art. 
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DISCUSSION 
W. NELSON FRANCIS (Brown University. Providence, R . I . ) :  1 am de- 
lighted myself to learn that there are such things as “fuzzy sets.” Back in the fif- 
ties when we are all trying to be very rigorous in defining linguistic categories, 
I was bold enough to say that a class of words like adjectives may be very 
clear in the center but gets fuzzier and fuzzier as  you get out to the periphery. 
This was a very bad thing to say back in the fifties; you remember that Jim 
Sledd, in his Short Introduction to English Grammrrr ( 1959), said that adjec- 
tives are  only those things which can take the -er and -est suffixes, and therefore 
beautiful is no more an adjective than chaos is a noun. I think Jim has changed 
his views a little since then. I now have a lovely term for what I was talking 
about-a “fuzzy set.” 
On the subject of hedges, there is one hedge that I particularly like because 
it is so contrariwise and must really upset non-native speakers-that is, literally. 
If you say “John is literally a fish,” you mean about the same thing as  “he 
is a regular fish,” which means he is not literally a fish at all. I have never 
looked in any dictionary to see if this meaning of literally is included. It’s a 
real challenge to a lexicographer t o  say that literally means the opposite of 
literal. 
